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The Charlie Gard and Alfie Evans cases were high-profile cases involving 
disagreements between the parents of young infants and medical practitioners, which 
have given impetus to pre-existing calls for law reform that have been rebranded as 
‘Charlie’s Law’ and ‘Alfie’s Law’. I argue against the proposal to replace the best 
interests test, which is currently determinative in such contentious cases, with a 
significant harm test, as it would render UK law divergent from international law. I also 
employ critical theory to rebut the notion that parents are the best decision makers 
and refute criticisms of clinicians (who reflexively acknowledged the limits of 
medicine). I utilise theories of distributive justice to demonstrate that legal reform may 
exacerbate unfairness, and case law to show that it may be unworkable. Nonetheless, 
I apply critical and Foucauldian theory to critique the lack of patient and public 
empowerment within the NHS and I endorse the proposal to ensure that mediation is 
offered in contentious cases, as this may empower patients and their carers. I also 
aver that the best interests test should be informed by clearer criteria regarding the 
allocation of finite resources, which the public should influence via the democratisation 
of the NHS.  
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In the United Kingdom (UK), the best interests test is determinative in cases where 
there are disputes between parents and medical practitioners regarding the treatment 
of young infants who lack the capacity to make their own decisions.1 It is also 
determinative where there are disputes between parents themselves. The former 
situation is exemplified by the recent cases concerning the treatment of the infants 
Charlie Gard and Alfie Evans.2 In both of those cases, parents disagreed with their 
children’s clinicians and wanted to take their children to hospitals abroad to continue 
life-sustaining treatment, however, the courts adjudicating on the cases determined 
that this would not be in the best interests of the infants. The cases have given traction 
to pre-existing arguments for law reform. Proposed reforms to the law (described as 
‘Charlie’s Law’ and ‘Alfie’s Law’ respectively) include substituting the best interests 
test with a significant harm test (which it is believed would strengthen parental rights) 
and ensuring that mediation is offered in contentious cases. I argue against replacing 
the best interests test but in favour of ensuring that mediation is offered in contentious 
cases.  
 
                                                          
1
 Children Act 1989, S.1(1). 
2 Great Ormond Street Hospital v Constance Yates, Chris Gard and Charles Gard (A Child by his 
Guardian Ad Litem) [2017] EWHC 972 (Fam) [20] and Alder Hey Children’s NHS Foundation Trust v 
Mr Thomas Evans, Ms Kate James, Alfie Evans (A Child by his Guardian CAFCASS Legal) [2018] 




I outline four arguments as to why substituting the best interests test with a significant 
harm test is not justified. First, this substitution would render UK law incompatible with 
international law. Secondly, I contend that some of those who desire this change seem 
to believe that parents should be afforded more scope to make decisions regarding 
the medical treatment of infants and that clinicians are often immune to opposing 
views. In contrast, I draw on critical theory to contend that parents are not always the 
best decision makers and to refute unwarranted criticisms of medical professionals 
(who reflexively admitted the limitations of medicine in the Gard and Evans cases3). 
Thirdly, I draw on theories of distributive justice to highlight the unfair distributive 
effects that such legal reform may exacerbate. Fourthly, case law is used to 
demonstrate how the proposed substitution could potentially be unworkable in some 
cases. Nonetheless, I also employ critical theory, and Foucauldian scholarship, to 
critique the historic and ongoing lack of empowerment of patients and the public within 
the NHS. I argue that the proposed reform to ensure that mediation is offered in 
contentious cases, would be a welcome change that could empower patients and their 
carers. In addition, I contend that the best interests test should be retained and 
informed by clearer criteria regarding the allocation of finite resources, and that the 
public should be empowered to have an influence on shaping such criteria via the 
democratisation of the NHS. Consequently, I argue that rather than strengthening 
parental rights, efforts to enhance patient and public involvement would be preferable.   
                                                          
3 In this respect, Katie Gollop QC, Counsel for Great Ormond Street Hospital, argued that Charlie 
would not benefit from further treatment (see K Gollop, ‘GOSH’s Position Statement Hearing on 24 
July 2017’ < 
https://www.gosh.nhs.uk/file/23731/download?token=TWJkSxZu > accessed 19 March 2019) and 
Michael Mylonas QC, Counsel for Alder Hey Children’s Hospital, argued that Alfie’s condition was 
untreatable (see M Mylonas, S Rickard and S Roper, ‘Thomas Evans & Kate James v Alder Hey 
Children’s NHS Foundation Trust’ < https://www.serjeantsinn.com/news/thomas-evans-kate-james-v-




II. BACKGROUND: DISPUTES BETWEEN PARENTS AND MEDICAL 
PRACTITIONERS 
 
In circumstances where a child is unwell, parents are generally able to make decisions 
about their care as part of their parental responsibility.4 In most cases, the parents of 
infants, who lack the capacity to make their own choices regarding medical treatment, 
and doctors, agree on the best course of action regarding the treatment of such 
infants.5 The General Medical Council (GMC) states that decisions about the treatment 
of children must always be in their best interests,6 as according to the GMC, ‘‘parents 
play an important role in assessing their child’s best interests and’’ clinicians ‘‘should 
work in partnership with them when considering decisions about their child’s 
treatment’’.7 Where treatments are no longer in the child’s best interests they ‘‘may be 
withheld, withdrawn or limited’’,8 which is what the clinicians deemed was in the best 
interests of Charlie and Alfie respectively. The Royal College of Paediatrics and Child 
Health (RCPCH) has published guidance which states that ‘‘healthcare teams 
may…not be justified in providing treatments that are highly expensive or limited in 
availability and that appear to offer little benefit to the child’’9 and the expense and 
disputed benefit of proposed experimental treatment were pertinent issues in the Gard 
                                                          
4 Children Act 1989, S.2 and S.3. Parents must provide children with adequate food, clothing, lodging 
and medical aid (Children and Young Persons Act (1933), S.1).  
5 D Wilkinson S Barclay and J Savulescu, ‘Disagreement, mediation, arbitration: resolving disputes 
about medical treatment’ (2018) The Lancet 391, 2302. 
6 General Medical Council, Treatment and Care Towards the End of Life: Good Practice in Decision 
Making (Manchester: General Medical Council, 2010) 45. 
7 ibid 46. 
8 V Larcher et al, ‘Making Decisions to Limit Treatment in Life-Limiting and Life-Threatening 




case. In some cases, there may be disputes between parents themselves10 or 
between parents and medical practitioners regarding treatment, and such cases may 
be referred to the courts to adjudicate upon, as occurred in the Gard and Evans cases. 
The Nuffield Council on Bioethics states that recourse to the courts could be avoided 
by better communication,11 but where cases are resolved in court, infants such as 
Charlie and Alfie, will be given an independent voice through a guardian from the 
Children and Family Court Advisory Support Service (CAFCASS).12  
 
The Children Act 1989 states that where a court determines any question with respect 
to the upbringing of a child, or the administration of a child’s property, ‘‘the child’s 
welfare shall be the paramount consideration’’.13 It has been confirmed, in relevant 
case law,14 that numerous factors will be considered in determining an individual’s 
welfare or best interests. For example, in Aintree University Hospital NHS Trust v 
James,15 Baroness Hale stated that in considering the best interests of a particular 
patient ‘‘decision-makers must look at his welfare in the widest sense, not just medical 
but social and psychological’’.16 The best interests principle is found in guidelines in 
numerous countries,17 however, one problem with the clinical factors that will be taken 
into consideration is that, given the nature of medicine, they ‘‘are often uncertain, 
changeable and challengeable’’18 and the vicissitudes of medicine may make 
                                                          
10 See for example, Re C (Welfare of a Child: Immunisation) [2003] 2 FLR 1095. 
11 Nuffield Council on Bioethics, Critical Case Decisions in Foetal and Neonatal Medicine: Ethical 
Issues. (London: Nuffield Council on Bioethics, 2006) 24. 
12 ibid 145. 
13 Children Act 1989, S.1(1).  
14 See, for example, Portsmouth NHS Trust v Wyatt [2004] EWHC 2247 (Fam). 
15 [2014] A.C. 59. 
16 ibid [65]. 
17 D Wilkinson, Death or Disability: The ‘Carmentis Machine’ and Decision Making for Young Children 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013) 47. 
18 E Cave and E Nottingham, ‘Who Knows Best (Interests)? The Case of Charlie Gard’ (2018) Medical 
Law Review 26, 500. 
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disagreements more likely.19 The best interests test has been criticised for being 
vague by both members of the judiciary20 and academics, with Taylor LJ stating that 
the test was ‘‘easily said but not easily applied’’.21 Douglas Diekema similarly argued 
that the test may provide little meaningful guidance in practice,22 and Theodor Adorno 
criticised legal norms for neglecting particularity for the sake of an ‘‘unbroken 
systematic’’.23 The best interests test can however, be defended on the basis that it is 
sufficiently malleable to take into account the particular circumstances of individual 
cases.24 In the Gard and Evans cases, the parents of the respective infants disagreed 
with the determinations of their children’s medical practitioners that continued medical 
care was not in their best interests and desired to transfer their children to hospitals 
abroad to continue life-sustaining treatment. However, they failed to persuade the 
courts that transferring them to foreign hospitals was in their best interests.  
 
Following the respective cases, the Charlie Gard Foundation (CGF) was established 
and has proposed reforms, which are known as ‘Charlie’s Law’. Similarly, Steven 
Woolfe (a former UK Independence Party (UKIP) member and an MEP for the North 
West region) and the think tank Parliament Street have advocated reforms, known as 
‘Alfie’s Law’.25 While there is no information about ‘Alfie’s Law’ on Parliament Street’s 
                                                          
19 D Wilkinson and J Savulescu, Ethics, Conflict and Medical Treatment for Children: From 
Disagreement to Dissensus (London: Elsevier, 2019) 121. 
20 L McCrossan and R Siegmeth, ‘Demands and requests for ‘inappropriate’ or ‘inadvisable’ 
treatments at the end of life: what do you do at 2 o’clock in the morning when …?’. (2017) British 
Journal of Anaesthesia 119, i90.  
21 Re J (A Minor) [1992] 4 ALL ER 614. 
22 D Diekema, ‘Parental Refusals of Medical Treatment: The Harm Principle as Threshold for State 
Intervention’ (2004) Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 25, 243. 
23 T Adorno, Negative Dialectics (London: Continuum, 1973), 309. 
24 Jonathan Herring also supports the welfare principle, in part, due to its flexibility. See J Herring, 
‘Farewell Welfare?’ (2005) Journal of Social Welfare and Family Law 27, 159. 
25 This has been reported in national newspapers. See, for example, H Christodoulou, ‘RIGHT TO 
DECIDE: What are Charlie’s Law and Alfie’s Law, what rights would they give parents over their 
children’s care and who has backed them?’, Sun, 3 September 2018, M Robinson, ‘‘If we can make a 
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website, there is information about ‘Charlie’s Law’ on CGF’s website.26 According to 
CGF’s website, it’s vision ‘‘is to enhance the quality of life for mitochondrial [mito] 
sufferers through innovative research, family support, and raise much needed 
awareness for this devastating condition’’.27 The aim of CGF is to ‘‘ensure we provide 
mito sufferers with every opportunity to get the very best out of life’’.28 It wants a 
change to the law to prevent cases reaching court (by ensuring that mediation is 
offered in contentious cases), to ensure that families are provided with advice and 
support and to protect parental rights by replacing the best interests test with a 
significant harm test.29 In subsequent paragraphs, I describe the facts of both cases, 
the relevant court decisions and wider responses. As I note below, many of those who 
commented on the cases appear to not have known all of the clinical facts, and some 
ideologists used the cases to unjustifiably criticise socialised medicine and medical 
professionals. I outline the reality of the cases in order to critique ideological comments 
concerning them. As Adorno stated, ‘‘ideologies...become false only by their 
relationship to…reality’’.30 This exposition of the facts, and critique of ideology,31 
informs my analysis of the proposed legal reforms.  
 
                                                          
difference like he did, I’ll die a happy man’: Charlie Gard’s parents discuss ‘Charlie’s Law’ on one-year 
anniversary of tot’s tragic death’, Daily Mail, 27 July 2018, S Kettley, ‘Alfie Evans update: What is Alfie’s 
Law? MPs urged to introduce new legislation’, Daily Express, 27 April 2018 and P Hurst, ‘‘Alfie’s Law’’ 
bid launched to give parents of terminally-ill children more say in their end of life care’, Daily Mirror, 26 
April 2018. 
26 Charlie Gard Foundation < https://www.thecharliegardfoundation.org/charlies-law/ >accessed 08 
October 2018. 
27 Charlie Gard Foundation <https://www.thecharliegardfoundation.org/mission-statement/ > accessed 
08 October 2018. 
28 ibid. 
29 Charlie Gard Foundation (n 26).  
30 T. Adorno, ‘Ideology’ in Frankfurt Institute of Social Research (ed) Aspects of Sociology (London: 
Heinemann,1973) 182, 198. 
31 I do not contend that the views of all of those who favoured different outcomes in the Gard and 
Evans cases are ideological, but rather that some ideologists used the cases to unjustifiably criticise 
socialised medicine and medical professionals.  
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A. CHARLIE GARD 
 
Charlie Gard was born to parents Christopher Gard and Constance Yates, in London, 
in August 2016. Charlie was born with a rare genetic disorder, known as mitochondrial 
DNA depletion syndrome (MDDS), in which the synthesis of nucleosides in 
mitochondria (organelles in cells) is impaired. MDDS causes progressive brain 
damage and muscle failure. Charlie was taken to Great Ormond Street Hospital 
(GOSH), in October 2016. He was put on a mechanical ventilator and fed by a 
nasogastric tube. The diagnosis of MDDS was confirmed by a genetic test, in 
November 2016. The genetic test showed that Charlie had two mutated versions of 
the gene coding for the RRM2B protein, for which there are currently no treatments. 
Nonetheless, an experimental treatment for MDDS, involving nucleoside 
supplementation, has been used on humans and mice with a mutation in a different 
gene, thymidine kinase 2 (TK2), which also impairs the synthesis of nucleosides in 
mitochondria, ‘‘with some recorded benefit’’.32 Charlie’s doctors were considering 
attempting the experimental treatment at GOSH in January 2017. They prepared an 
application for approval from the Rapid Response Clinical Ethics Committee and 
invited an expert neurologist, Professor Michio Hirano (of the Neurological Institute of 
New York), to examine Charlie33 after Constance Yates had communicated with him 
following her own internet searches.  
 
                                                          
32 Great Ormond Street Hospital (n 2) [20]. 
33 Gollop (n 3). 
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However, Charlie began having epileptic seizures, in January 2017, which were 
deemed to have rendered him brain damaged. Scans of Charlie’s brain indicated that 
he did not have a sleep/wake cycle, which is indicative of severe brain atrophy and his 
clinicians determined that the experimental treatment would be futile. An expert team 
from Barcelona, Spain, providing a second opinion, arrived at the same conclusion.34 
While there was a lack of either animal or human data to support the nucleoside 
treatment, there was evidence that Charlie had severe neurologic injury that could not 
be reversed.35 Despite this, Charlie’s parents wanted to take him to New York to 
receive the nucleoside treatment, which Professor Hirano (who eventually examined 
Charlie in person in July 2017) was prepared to try. The Bambino Gesu Hospital in 
Rome, Italy, also offered to allow Charlie to receive the experimental treatment there. 
Charlie’s parents forwent their privacy in order to raise funds for the treatment that 
they desired for him.36 They launched an appeal on a crowdfunding website, 
GoFundMe,37 at the end of January and had raised over one million pounds by the 
end of April.  
 
GOSH asked the High Court to exercise its inherent jurisdiction to make the following 
orders: that Charlie, by reason of his minority, lacked capacity to make decisions 
regarding his medical treatment; that it would be lawful, and in Charlie’s best interests, 
for artificial ventilation to be withdrawn; that it would be lawful, and in Charlie’s best 
interests, for his treating clinicians to provide him with palliative care only; and, that it 
                                                          
34 Great Ormond Street Hospital v Yates [2017] EWCA Civ 410 [114]. 
35 R Truog, ‘The United Kingdom sets limits on experimental treatment: The case of Charlie Gard’ 
(2017), The Journal of the American Medical Association 318, 1001.   
36 R Hurley, ‘How a fight for Charlie Gard became a fight against the state’. British Medical Journal 
2017;358:j3675. 




would be lawful, and in Charlie’s best interests, for him not to undergo nucleoside 
therapy.38 The case attracted worldwide media attention and comment, including 
being the subject of tweets by United States (US) President, Donald Trump, and the 
head of the Roman Catholic Church, Pope Francis. Those championing the cause of 
Charlie’s parents became known as ‘Charlie’s Army’ and some commentators on the 
case, politicians and supporters of Charlie’s parents ‘‘attacked the hospital, the 
doctors, and the health system’’.39 Charlie’s situation was used in political propaganda 
by religious fundamentalists, neoliberals and opponents of Obamacare.40 The former 
holding the vitalist belief that life is an absolute good.41 However, it has been argued 
that the sanctity of life is not a fundamental tenet of a civilised society42 and case law 
has established that it is not absolute.43 Many of those venturing opinions and offering 
treatments apparently did so ‘‘without knowledge of the full clinical circumstances’’44  
and some of the commentary on the case may have given Charlie’s parents false 
hope.45 Ranjana Das’s discourse analysis of posts made by supporters of Charlie’s 
parents on the social network Facebook found that they displayed a range of ‘markers’ 
of populism.46 Such markers included the creation of ethical-moral distinctions 
between a vulnerable in-group and an evil out-group, blame attribution to produce 
professionals as evil and generate a rhetoric of vulnerable ordinariness and the 
                                                          
38 Great Ormond Street Hospital (n 2) [5]. 
39 D Wilkinson, ‘Restoring balance to “best interests” disputes in children’. British Medical Journal 
2017;358:j3666. 
40 Hurley (n 36). 
41 D Wilkinson (n 39) 27. 
42 H Kuhse and P Singer (1985) Should the baby live? The Problem of Handicapped Infants 
(Aldershot: Gregg Revivals, 1985) 98.  
43 Larcher et al (n 8). 
44 Hurley (n 36). 
45 Cave and Nottingham (n 18)/N Modi, ‘Foreword 2’ in D Wilkinson and J Savulescu, Ethics, Conflict 
and Medical Treatment for Children: From Disagreement to Dissensus (London: Elsevier, 2019), ix. 
46 R Das, ‘Populist discourse on a British social media patient-support community: The case of the 
Charlie Gard support campaign on Facebook’ (2018) Discourse, Context & Media 24, 76. 
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rejection of expertise with ‘common sense’.47 I argue, below, that the latter is part of a 
broader trend in modern societies. 
 
In April 2017, Francis J ruled, by declaration that it was in Charlie’s best interests for 
him to accede to GOSH’s applications.48 In his judgment, Francis J noted that ‘‘no one 
in the world has ever treated this form of MDDS with nucleoside therapy’’ and that 
there was ‘‘no evidence that nucleoside therapy can cross the blood/brain barrier 
which it must do to treat RRM2B’’.49 In determining Charlie’s best interests, Francis J 
considered whether Charlie could experience pain.50 The GOSH team believed that 
Charlie could ‘‘probably experience pain, but is unable to react to it in a meaningful 
way’’.51 While Francis J stated that it could be possible to transport Charlie to the US 
for treatment, in his view, this would be ‘‘futile’’ as ‘‘the prospect of the nucleoside 
treatment having any benefit is as close to zero as makes no difference’’.52 
 
The parents appealed unsuccessfully to the Court of Appeal53 and the Supreme Court 
refused a further appeal.54 In the Court of Appeal, Richard Gordon QC, acting on 
behalf of the parents, argued that Francis J had not used the correct legal test. He 
averred that Francis J had failed to distinguish between two different types of cases: 
cases involving parents who oppose the course of treatment for which the treating 
clinicians apply, but who do not have a viable alternative treatment, and cases where 
                                                          
47 ibid. 
48 Great Ormond Street Hospital (n 2) [23] 
49 ibid [20]. 
50 ibid [22]. 
51 ibid [22]. 
52 ibid [119]. 
53 Great Ormond Street Hospital (n 34). 
54 The Supreme Court Decision of 08 June 2017, in the Matter of Charlie Gard. 
12 
 
the parents propose a viable alternative treatment option to the one proposed by the 
treating clinicians.55 Gordon argued that Charlie’s case fell into the second category 
and sought to rely on Baker J’s judgment in Re King.56 That case involved a five-year-
old boy, named Ashya King, and had also attracted worldwide media attention. Ashya 
had a medulloblastoma (malignant brain tumour) removed through surgery, at 
Southampton General Hospital (SGH), in July 2014. His parents wanted his cancer to 
be treated with proton therapy, which they thought was less harmful than conventional 
radiotherapy (the side effects of which include intellectual and cognitive impairment57). 
Although the proton therapy was not then available in the UK (it became available in 
201758), NHS England had authorised and funded the provision of the treatment to 
some English patients in foreign hospitals.59 Nevertheless, the therapy was not 
recommended for medulloblastoma due to concerns about logistics and delays.60 
Ashya’s parents feared that if they questioned the treatment plan, an emergency 
protection order would be sought.61 Consequently, in late August 2014, they took him 
out of the hospital, without informing the medical team, leading to an international 
search. Ashya’s clinicians feared that if his nasogastric tube (which his parents had no 
training in respect of) became displaced, he could choke to death.62 Ashya was found 
with his parents two days later in Velez Malaga, Spain. He was made a ward of the 
High Court which ruled, in September 2014, that he could receive proton therapy in 
Prague, Czech Republic. In his judgment, Baker J stated that:  
                                                          
55 Great Ormond Street Hospital (n 2) [58]. 
56 [2014] 2 FLR 855. 
57 J Bridgeman, ‘Misunderstanding, Threats and Fear of the Law in Conflicts over Children’s 
Healthcare: In the Matter of Ashya King [2014] EWHC 2964’ (2015) Medical Law Review 23, 477. 
58 Wilkinson and Savulescu (n 19) 82. 
59 Re King (n 56) [9].  
60 ibid [10]. 
61 Bridgeman (n 57). 




‘‘In most cases, the parents are the best people to make decisions about a child 
and the State – whether it be the court, or any other public authority – has no 
business interfering with the exercise of parental responsibility unless the child 
is suffering or is likely to suffer significant harm as a result of the care given to 
the child not being what it would be reasonable to expect a parent to give’’.63 
 
Gordon contended that Re King demonstrated that a parent’s preferred treatment 
option should only be overridden if it is established that the option would likely cause 
the child “significant harm”.64 
 
McFarlane LJ delivered the leading judgment in the Court of Appeal. He noted that 
Ashya’s and Charlie’s cases differed as, in the former, SGH advised the High Court 
that it would not oppose Ashya receiving treatment in Prague as long as funds were 
made available.65 McFarlane LJ concluded that Baker J’s judgment did not provide 
any basis for saying that significant harm is the relevant test66 in respect of medical 
treatment (he noted that Baker J did not refer to medical treatment in the relevant part 
of his judgment67) and that if he had intended to say this then he was ‘‘plainly in 
error’’.68 The Court of Appeal therefore rejected the appeal on the basis that the correct 
legal test had been used.  
                                                          
63 ibid [31]. 
64 Great Ormond Street Hospital (n 34) [55] 
65 ibid [62]/ Re King (n 51) [18]. 
66 Great Ormond Street Hospital (n 34) [104]. 
67 ibid [102].  




In the Supreme Court, Baroness Hale also responded to the argument that the wrong 
test had been used. She noted that the Children Act 1989, S.1(1), reflects but is 
stronger than the United Nations (UN) Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), 
Article 3(1),69 as it states that a child’s welfare is the ‘‘paramount consideration’’, 
whereas the CRC states that:   
 
“in all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or private social 
welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies, 
the best interests of the child shall be a primary consideration.”70  
 
Baroness Hale also noted that the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has 
stated that in any judicial decision where the rights under Article 8 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR),71 the right to respect for the private and family 
life of the parents and the child are at stake, the child's rights must be the paramount 
consideration and must prevail if there is any conflict.72 Charlie’s parents also made 
an application to the ECtHR, on the basis that their rights had been infringed, but this 
was declared inadmissible in June 2017.73 In July 2017, the case returned to the High 
Court, as Charlie’s parents wanted the court to consider new evidence from Professor 
Hirano.74 Francis J confirmed the previous declarations he had made in April (which 
had been stayed), which Charlie’s parents ceased to oppose as they ultimately 
                                                          
69 Convention on the Rights of the Child (signed 19 April 1990; entered into force 15 January 1992) 
1577 U.N.T.S. 3. 
70 The Supreme Court Decision of 08 June 2017 (n 54) [10]. 
71 (ETS 5) (Signed 4 November 1950; entered into force 3 September 1953) 213 U.N.T.S. 222. This 
was incorporated into UK law via the Human Rights Act (1998). 
72 The Supreme Court Decision of 08 June 2017 (n 54) [10]. 
73 Gard v United Kingdom Application No. 39793/17 (2017) 65 E.H.R.R. SE9. 
74 Cave and Nottingham (n 18). 
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determined that the window of opportunity for Charlie to improve had passed.75 The 
High Court also made declarations concerning Charlie’s end of life care, namely that 




B. ALFIE EVANS 
 
Alfie Evans was born in Liverpool, in May 2016, to parents Thomas Evans and Kate 
James. He was admitted to Alder Hey Children’s Hospital (AHCH) in December 2016 
due to a history of coughing, high-temperature and rhythmic jerking of his jaw and four 
limbs.77 It was determined that he had an undiagnosed neurological condition. 
Throughout December 2016 and January 2017 Alfie was ‘‘very unwell with severe 
bilateral pneumonia, such that the treating clinicians felt that they had no alternative 
but to broach with the parents the real possibility that’’ he ‘‘might not survive’’.78 
Nonetheless, Alfie did not succumb to the pneumonia. Hayden J noted that this had 
an impact on his father’s views about continued treatment.79 Alfie underwent three 
magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) scans in November 2016, February 2017 and 
August 2017. The last MRI scan revealed that 70% of his brain had been destroyed.80 
Doctors from the Bambino Gesu Hospital examined Alfie in September 2017. They 
determined that they could offer Alfie prolonged ventilator support but noted that 
                                                          
75 ibid. 
76 Great Ormond Street Hospital for Children NHS Foundation Trust v Yates and others (No.2) [2017] 
4 WLR 131. 
77 Alder Hey Children’s NHS Foundation Trust (n 2) [6]. 
78 E (A Child) [2018] EWCA Civ 550 [9]. 
79 Alder Hey Children’s NHS Foundation Trust (n 2) [10]. 
80 E (A Child) (n 78) [12]. 
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transporting him to Rome could provoke further seizures and damage to his brain.81 
However, the doctors at the Bambino Gesu Hospital were not offering a different 
diagnosis or treatment.82 The Italian government issued a citizenship certificate to Alfie 
to enable him to travel to Italy,83 and Dr Matthias Hubner, the Medical Director of the 
Paediatric Air Ambulance in Munich, Germany, also examined Alfie, surreptitiously, 
and determined that he was fit to fly.84 Hubner was subsequently criticised, by King 
LJ, for clandestinely examining Alfie, for not reading all of his notes and for 
recommending an inappropriate anticonvulsant medical regime.85 
 
While Alfie’s parents wanted him to be transferred to Rome (and if this did not lead to 
any improvement, then subsequently to Munich), his doctors determined that it was in 
his best interests for his life-support to be switched off, as there was no hope for Alfie 
and continued treatment was inhumane. Similarly to the Charlie Gard case, the dispute 
generated worldwide media interest and Alfie’s parents garnered supporters who 
described themselves as ‘Alfie’s Army’. ‘Alfie’s Army’ mobilised through Facebook, 
gathered outside AHCH86 and even attempted to storm AHCH.87 Again the dispute 
was utilised by those promoting their own ideological agendas.88 Such ideologists 
included religious fundamentalists (the London based Christian Legal Centre 
represented Alfie’s parents through their unsuccessful legal appeals) and US 
conservatives, who used it to criticise socialised medicine.89 The latter is undermined 
                                                          
81 ibid [21]. 
82 ibid. 
83 U Schuklenk, ‘Bioethics culture wars-2018 edition: Alfie Evans’ (2018) Bioethics 32, 270. 
84 E (A Child) (n 78) [23]. 
85 ibid [24]. 
86 C Dyer, ‘Alfie Evans Case: Proposed Law aims to prevent conflicts between parents and doctors’. 
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by the fact that for-profit health insurance companies, which dominate healthcare in 
the US, do not typically fund futile care.90 
 
Similarly to the Gard case, as the parents and clinicians could not resolve the dispute 
it proceeded to court. In the High Court, Hayden J determined that continued 
ventilatory support was no longer in Alfie’s best interests.91 Alfie’s parents appealed to 
the Court of Appeal contending that Hayden J had not properly weighed their views in 
the best interests decision (in breach of ECHR, Article 14, which requires that the 
rights and freedoms of the convention be applied without discrimination, and Article 
8),92 had not properly considered what would be an appropriate palliative care 
pathway93 and had failed to assess matters relevant to best interests or to weigh up 
the available alternatives.94 The Court of Appeal did not find merit in the grounds of 
appeal and upheld the High Court’s decision. The parents launched further appeals, 
but the Supreme Court refused their permission to appeal in March 201895 and the 
ECtHR ruled the case inadmissible, as no human rights had been violated.96  
 
In the Supreme Court, Baroness Hale again addressed arguments that the significant 
harm test was the relevant test, advanced by the parent’s counsel, Stephen Knafler 
QC. Baroness Hale noted that Knafler contended that: 
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‘‘if significant harm (or its likelihood) has to be established before a child can be 
removed – perhaps only temporarily – from the home of his parents under a care 
order, why does it not need to be established before he can be removed, 
permanently, from them and from everything in this world, by death?’’97  
 
In respect of the removal of a child from their parents, the Children Act 1989 provides 
that a court may, following an application from a local authority, make a care order or 
a supervision order if it is satisfied that the child concerned is suffering, or is likely to 
suffer, significant harm98 and that the harm or likelihood of harm, is attributable to the 
care given to the child, or likely to be given to him if the order were not made, not being 
what it would be reasonable to expect a parent to give to him99 or the child’s being 
beyond parental control.100 Harm is defined as ill-treatment or the impairment of health 
(physical or mental) or development.101  
 
Baroness Hale reiterated that the Children Act 1989, S.1(1), required that the child’s 
welfare be the ‘‘paramount consideration’’ of the court102 and that this reflected the 
aforementioned international law. She explained that the difference with care 
proceedings was that Parliament determined that there should be an initial hurdle 
(significant harm) before an assessment of the child’s best interests ‘‘to avoid social 
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engineering’’ and protect families from a ‘‘too ready’’ removal of children.103 Baroness 
Hale averred that no qualification was required in cases concerning the contested 
medical treatment of an infant, where the imperative was for doctors to know what is 
required of them.104 She also stated that Alfie’s parents had not been discriminated 
against as their situation was ‘‘not comparable with that of the parents of children who 
are taken away from them by the state to be brought up elsewhere’’.105 Alfie’s life 
support was ultimately withdrawn in late April 2018 and he died a few days afterwards 
and following Alfie’s death, his case has continued to be used within ideological 
narratives. For example, John Allman (former parliamentary candidate for the 
Christian People’s Alliance) submitted an application for judicial review on the grounds 
that the relevant Senior Coroner (Andre Rebello) should have conducted an 
investigation106 of Alfie’s death, as he was allegedly in state detention (an argument 
which had already been rejected by the Supreme Court107). The application was 
refused by Cockerill J on the basis that it was totally without merit.108   
 
III. EVALUATING THE PROPOSED LEGAL REFORMS 
 
Prior to the Gard and Evans cases, there had been academic debates concerning 
whether the law in this area should be reformed. For example, Diekema argued that 
the significant harm test was preferable to the best interests test109 and other 
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academics have advocated a zone of parental discretion (ZPD), which has been 
defined as ‘‘a protected space in which parents may legitimately make decisions for 
their children’’.110 The high-profile nature of the Gard and Evans cases has given 
impetus to the desire for legal change. In contrast, before those cases were decided, 
the Nuffield Council on Bioethics determined that the best interests principle is 
‘‘appropriate and sufficient’’.111 In response to the cases, some, such as Eliana Close 
et al,112 have defended the capacity of the best interests test to settle disputes. 
However, I agree with Neera Bhatia that if the best interests test is preserved, it should 
be informed by clearer criteria (particularly pertaining to the allocation of finite 
healthcare resources).113 Raanan Gillon has argued that in Charlie Gard’s case the 
courts did not adequately examine some considerations relevant to the best interests 
test, namely: ‘‘people’s enormously variable attitudes to pursuing low probabilities of 
benefit in order to seek cures or ameliorations of disease disability and illness’’,114 and 
the belief of a sector of the population ‘‘that it is never in a person’s best interests to 
have his or her life deliberately ended by either withholding or withdrawing an available 
life-prolonging treatment’’.115 In respect of the former, if the courts took this into 
account, it could homogenise such attitudes by legitimising the views of those who 
desire low probabilities to be pursued, thereby potentially generating more disputes 
and having deleterious distributive effects. In respect of the latter, the fact that many 
hold this view does not necessarily mean that the law should take it into account. If 
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this view did influence the law, it could again have negative distributive effects by 
potentially never legitimising the withdrawal of treatment. Nevertheless, the notion that 
medicine has limited utility for some patients has ancient roots.116 As the Athenian 
philosopher Plato stated, Asclepius (the Greek God of medicine) ‘‘did not attempt to 
prescribe regimens for those whose bodies were riddled with disease, so that…he 
could make their life a prolonged misery’’.117  
 
As mentioned above, right-wing ideologists118 have sought to utilise the contentious 
cases in a spurious effort to portray publicly funded and provided healthcare 
negatively. This is exemplified by Woolfe’s comment that the state should no longer 
be regarded as the champion of the child ‘‘when it’s the parents who should be the 
champion of the child’’.119 Similarly, CGF wants the ‘best interests’ test to be replaced 
with a ‘significant harm’ test (which counsel for the parents of Charlie and Alfie 
contended was the correct legal test in the aforementioned appeals) as the former 
‘‘provides a broad platform for the overruling of parent’s wishes’’.120 While it is 
uncommon for judges to rule against medical opinion,121 in some cases the views of 
parents have been determinative in deciding best interests.122 CGF contend that: 
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‘‘In Charlie’s case, Chris and Connie firmly believe that there was insufficient 
evidence to prove that moving Charlie from one hospital to another would have 
risked significant harm. If this is correct, Charlie’s Law would have prevented the 
judge from making a court order precluding such movement…’’123. 
 
CGF seem to believe that changing the test would mean that parent’s wishes would 
be more likely to be determinative. Charles Foster notes that ‘‘the use of the word 
‘harm’ is more protective to parents than the more nuanced term ‘best interests’’’ as 
‘‘it sets the bar for intervention higher’’.124 However, while the best interests test has 
been criticised for being vague, the same criticism has been levelled at the significant 
harm test. For example, Giles Birchley notes that what constitutes a harm is likely to 
be contested.125 Birchley therefore contends that a significant harm test would suffer 
from the same level of indeterminacy as the best interests test.126 Consequently, given 
the vague nature of both tests, they could produce the same result. Indeed, both 
McFarlane LJ and Baroness Hale averred in the Charlie Gard case that undergoing 
the experimental treatment would cause ‘significant harm’ to Charlie (although as 
indicated above, this may be contested).127 Similarly, it has been argued that the 
aforementioned ZPD may not provide greater clarity.128 Thus even if the law were 
changed, it is possible that if an identical case to the one involving Charlie Gard arose, 
it may be decided in the same way. If this were to occur, CGF’s efforts to reform the 
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law would have been in vain. A reformed law may not alter the outcome in a Charlie 
Gard type case but would suffer from several problems outlined in the following 
paragraphs.  
 
Firstly, as Baroness Hale’s comments in both the Gard and Evans cases highlight, the 
current law in the UK is consistent with international law. If UK law is reformed to 
strengthen parental rights, it would be incompatible with such international law, namely 
the aforementioned CRC and the jurisprudence of the ECtHR, which require the best 
interests of a child to be the primary, or paramount, consideration of welfare 
institutions, courts and others in considering cases involving children. This would no 
longer be the case if legal reform installs a harm threshold, which must be met before 
a question can be referred to the courts, or if the principle guiding the decisions of 
courts is whether the treatment favoured by the parents would be capable of causing 
the child significant harm. Carolyne Willow (Director of the children’s rights charity 
Article 39) has contended that reform could ‘‘undo decades of progress in establishing 
the rights of children- as human beings with individual worth and integrity’’ rather than 
chattel.129 The ZPD notion has been criticised for the same reason.130 
 
Secondly, I contend that installing a legal principle which is more protective of parents 
is not justified or normatively preferable. It has been argued that parent’s interests 
should be afforded greater weight given that decisions are likely to have a long and 
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profound impact on them.131 However, as Birchley argues, overruling parental 
interests may protect parents from the devastating effect that making a particular 
decision may have on their well-being.132 It has also been argued that parents should 
make decisions about the medical treatment of infants as they make other decisions 
regarding their children (some of which may be suboptimal).133 However, I agree with 
Birchley that the goods conferred by medical treatment are of a fundamentally different 
order to everyday goods, which justifies different rules.134 In addition, some of those 
advocating reform, such as CGF and Woolfe, appear to believe that parents would 
make better decisions than clinicians in these types of cases, if legal reform afforded 
them the scope to do so. I utilise critical theory to challenge this belief in the next two 
paragraphs.   
 
Parents may seek to justify themselves being the ultimate decision makers regarding 
the treatment of their children on the basis that they have more intimate knowledge of 
their children than others. Francis J gave succour to such claims by stating, in his 
decision in the Charlie Gard case, that ‘‘there is no doubt, of course, that the parents 
know Charlie immeasurably better than anybody else does, professional or otherwise’’ 
given the number of hours that they had spent with their son.135 However, the parents 
in the Gard and Evans cases held views and made claims that could be validated or 
refuted by medical professionals. For example, Constance Yates testified that ‘‘she 
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did not think that Charlie’s brain function is as bad as everyone else is saying’’.136 She 
disputed the GOSH clinicians determination that Charlie ‘‘did not have a sleep/wake 
cycle’’ claiming that she knew ‘‘full well when he is awake and when he is asleep’’137. In 
the Evans case, Alfie’s father, Thomas, disputed the diagnosis of the doctors at AHCH 
and claimed that his son ‘‘looks him in the eye’’ and ‘‘wants help’’.138 The claims of the 
parents in such cases drew on their closeness to their children and may have been 
fuelled by understandable emotions, unconscious biases and misplaced hope. 
Religious attitudes (which were evident in both cases) can influence belief in 
miracles.139 In addition, the information age has increased public awareness of 
medical technology.140 Bhatia contends that advancements in technology and medical 
science have entrenched an expectation that everything that can be done should be 
done.141 She avers that as medical professionals are now able to save infants who 
may have died as little as two decades ago, there is often an unrealistic expectation 
that they can keep critically ill infants alive.142 The beliefs held and claims made by 
parents are not privileged or immune from criticism but can often be corroborated or 
refuted. If the law is reformed to strengthen parental rights, this could potentially 
encourage such misplaced hope in future cases and thereby generate more acrimony. 
 
Medical opinion is also not privileged or immune from criticism. As noted above, 
medical opinion evolves, hence practices and treatments change over time. The 
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success of medical innovation and technologies over the last century has led some to 
mistaken conclusions, such as the notion that infectious diseases had been 
conquered.143 The dialectic of enlightenment, identified by the Frankfurt School critical 
theorists Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer, was that reason can engender 
unreason.144 Consequently, Adorno and Horkheimer contended that progress should 
be accompanied by critique rather than affirmation.145 The application of critical 
thinking to medicine would emphasise the many challenges it faces (such as 
increasing anti-microbial resistance) and the many diseases (such as Alzheimer’s and 
the MDDS that afflicted Charlie Gard) for which it currently offers no cures, as well as 
the advancements that have been achieved. The belief that there is no illness which 
medicine cannot, or will not ultimately, cure, together with hope, may be 
unscrupulously exploited by those offering unproven treatments. The process of 
trialling new medicines and treatments offers protection from false hope and quackery. 
In the Gard and Evans cases, the medical practitioners who reflexively acknowledged 
the limits of medicine (in contrast to the parents) were denigrated.  Woolfe’s comments 
concerning the Evans case, exemplify this point:  
 
‘‘the vast weight of medical evidence delivered by one set of professionals can 
become a rolling stone, trampling over opinions from all other experts. There is 
a danger, also, that once the hospital decides on a certain course of action, they 
get tunnel vision; they become closed to all other arguments or evidence’’.146  
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Such comments misrepresent medical enquiry as a monolith immune from influence. 
However, as Adorno argued, in the modern sciences ‘‘ratio peers over the wall it itself 
erects that it snatches a snippet of what does not agree with its own ingrained 
categories’’.147  Woolfe’s comments do not fit well with the facts of either the Gard or 
Evans cases, where other opinions were considered by both the treating clinicians and 
the courts. Other opinions were not trampled on in the Gard or Evans cases and there 
was no evidence to suggest that the course of action favoured by the parents could 
have helped Charlie or Alfie. Nonetheless, I argue below that there is a need to 
empower patients within the NHS and that the enhanced involvement of patients and 
their carers (such as parents) in the NHS may be helpful in promoting dialogue and 
understanding where disputes arise.  
 
A third argument against replacing the best interests test with a significant harm test 
is that it could have negative impacts in respect of distributive justice. The theory of 
distributive justice (how a society should allocate resources) goes back at least two 
millennia.148 Bhatia avers that major theories of justice (such as utilitarianism) are 
generally consistent with a distributive justice approach to the allocation of important 
and finite resources.149 But, if the law allows parents to be the final decision makers, 
Dominic Wilkinson and Julian Savulescu argue this could consume limited medical 
resources thereby compromising ‘‘the ability of health professionals and the health 
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system to treat other children and distribute resources fairly’’.150 One could 
conceivably argue that as Charlie Gard’s parents were able to crowd fund the money 
for treatment, there would be no negative distributional effects if they had been 
permitted to take him to New York to receive the treatment.151 However, while such 
crowdfunding may be a means to alleviate some injustices pertaining to health 
systems, it poses a number of ethical questions in relation to potential fraud or 
misrepresentation, fairness and the commodification of healthcare.152 A morally 
relevant question is whether it is right for an individual to contribute money to a fund 
to pay for experimental treatment for a child, which in all likelihood will not work, when 
they could, alternatively, contribute the money to funds for other children in the world 
who are dying from diseases, which could be easily remedied by treatments which are 
of proven effectiveness.  
 
The Gard and Evans cases have already had a detrimental impact with regard to 
distributive justice by diverting money from medical care to lawyers. GOSH reportedly 
incurred legal costs of £205,000 (including VAT) in the Gard case, AHCH incurred 
legal costs of £218,000 (excluding VAT) in the Evans case and CAFCASS incurred 
legal costs of £32,500 in the former case and £17,000 in the latter case.153 In addition, 
RCPCH has expressed concern that the criticism of medical professionals in recent 
cases could make it harder for the NHS to recruit and retain vital staff, which could 
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ultimately negatively impact the services that are available to all families.154 If the law 
is reformed as has been suggested, it may exacerbate negative distributive effects as 
more parents may be emboldened to demand treatments of questionable 
effectiveness, thereby diverting funds to such treatments, meaning that less resources 
are available for other patients. Wilkinson and Tara Nair argue that this could be 
avoided by installing a cost threshold to overrule the preferences of parents, even 
where a harm threshold is not exceeded.155 However, it is questionable whether a cost 
threshold could offset all of the negative distributional effects of a change to the law. 
Jeremy Snyder contends that crowdfunding fosters norms of competition, 
privatization, corporatization and the market.156 Such crowdfunding may thus 
exacerbate health inequalities by furnishing privileged persons with another means of 
accessing health care which disadvantaged groups are unable to access.157 If the law 
is reformed to strengthen parental rights, this could thus potentially increase 
inequalities in respect of its impact on access to resources both within and outside of 
the NHS, and undermine the ethos of the NHS by encouraging commodification. I 
argue that enhancing patient and public involvement within the NHS is preferable to 
commodification, as facilitating such involvement could potentially empower all 
patients rather than a few. 
 
A fourth argument against replacing the best interests test is that this proposed reform 
may prove unworkable in many instances, particularly as it has been confirmed in 
numerous cases that the courts will not compel a doctor to treat. For example, Lord 
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Donaldson MR stated in Re J (A Minor) (Wardship: Medical Treatment) that the courts 
cannot ‘‘insist on treatment’’.158 This has been reaffirmed in subsequent cases.159 If 
the best interests test was replaced with a significant harm test, the fact that the courts 
will not compel doctors to undertake specific treatments means that clinicians would 
not be legally required to provide treatments which they disagreed with, but which 
parents were insisting on. Consequently, parent’s desires for particular treatments to 
be tried may still be frustrated even if the test is changed. In theory, the law could also 
be changed to compel doctors to treat in such circumstances, to prevent the parent’s 
wishes being thwarted. However, a legal change compelling clinicians to treat 
(contrary to their professional judgment) would deprive clinicians of their ability to 
meaningfully exercise their professional judgment. Such a change would thereby 
involve the degradation, or proletarianization, of medical labour, which Harry 
Braverman identified in the workforces of contemporary capitalist societies.160 The 
phenomenon of the degradation of labour is linked to commodification, which as 
mentioned above may also be exacerbated by legal reform in this area. Although 
without such a change, clinicians could not be compelled to undertake specific 
treatments, they would still need court permission to discontinue life support where 
disputes arise. Some parents who have sufficient resources (or can accrue them 
through charity) may be able to seek treatments abroad, but this option may not be 
available to all parents. The four arguments outlined above demonstrate that replacing 
the best interests test with a significant harm test, to strengthen parental rights, is 
undesirable. Nonetheless, the best interests test should be informed by clearer criteria, 
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which the public should have a role in shaping. In addition, reform to ensure that 
mediation is offered in cases where disputes arise would be a welcome means of 
empowering patients and, where relevant, their carers. 
 
IV. PATIENT AND PUBLIC EMPOWERMENT 
 
The disputes in the Charlie Gard and Alfie Evans cases, and the campaigns and media 
coverage that they engendered, are symptomatic of a broader trend of the diminishing 
esteem in which various kinds of expertise is held. In the medical context, parents are 
now more likely to question the judgment of healthcare professionals than they were 
in the past.161 This tendency in modern societies of the dwindling esteem in which 
expertise is held may have some justification but can also have pernicious effects. For 
example, the World Health Organisation (WHO) has stated that misinformation 
regarding vaccinations has contributed to a spike in the number of measles cases 
worldwide.162 Nonetheless, although the questioning of experts may often be a 
populist endeavour, it is necessary to critically engage with the relationship between 
experts and service-users across the public services. When the NHS was established, 
in 1948, it was a professionally dominated service, leading the Foucauldian scholars, 
Peter Miller and Nikolas Rose, to describe it as a medical enclosure.163 Similarly, the 
critical theorist, Jurgen Habermas, argued that welfare state bureaucracies had 
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reifying effects as they ‘‘treated [people] as objects’’.164  Peter Beresford contends that 
the dominant strand in social policy, at the time, Fabianism, involved a top down elitist 
approach and a cult of the expert, hence there was a failure to adequately involve 
citizens, patients and service users.165  
 
The NHS was designed to be accountable to the public through ministerial 
accountability to Parliament. However, a Royal Commission on the NHS, in the 1970s, 
determined that ‘‘detailed ministerial accountability’’ was ‘‘largely a constitutional 
fiction’’.166 The National Health Service Act (1946), transferred the responsibility for 
hospitals from local authorities (which administered municipal hospitals167) to 
appointed bodies (Regional Hospital Boards) accountable to the Minister of Health. 
This transfer was unsuccessfully opposed, on democratic grounds, in the cabinet of 
the Labour government which introduced the NHS, by Herbert Morrison (Deputy Prime 
Minister between 1945 and 1951), and by backbenchers, such as Frederick Messer, 
who lamented the ‘‘loss of faith in the elected principle’’.168 Aneurin Bevan (Minister of 
Health between 1945 and 1951) subsequently conceded that ‘‘election is a better 
principle than selection’’.169 Bevan hoped that a future reform would democratise the 
system.170 However, this has not transpired.  
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The neglect of the voices of patients and the public led to numerous patient’s rights 
groups being established from the 1960s onwards to fight for patient’s rights.171 As 
Alex Mold notes, by the 1990s, such groups had secured rights to access medical 
records172 and to complain,173 in addition to the right to consent to treatment, despite 
professional resistance.174 In addition, Community Health Councils (CHCs) were 
established in the 1970s, to represent patient voices within the NHS.175 The 
Association of Community Health Councils for England and Wales (ACHCEW) was 
established in 1978 to assist CHCs.176 Both voice and choice are potential means of 
empowering patients.177 Neo-liberalism became the dominant strand in social policy 
in the 1970s, and Beresford contends that neo-liberal social policy is no more 
participatory than Fabian social policy and reflects the same commitment to self-
defined experts (such as consultants).178 Since the 1990s, the main emphasis of 
successive governments has been on empowering patients via furnishing them, or 
purchasers acting on their behalf (such as Clinical Commissioning Groups (CCGs) 
since 2013), with choices facilitated by the marketization of the NHS. However, as 
Mold notes, ‘‘choice was an attractive way to package NHS reform: it was not always 
about giving the patient more to choose from’’.179 For example, the market introduced 
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by the Health and Social Care Act (2012) was justified on the basis that it would extend 
patient choice,180 but this policy has taken a backseat.181 
 
Although successive governments within the neo-liberal era have also persisted with 
voice mechanisms, these have been weakened. CHCs were abolished in England 
(they endure in Wales) in the early 2000s182 and their functions were taken over by 
several successor bodies, such as the Independent Complaints Advocacy Service 
(ICAS), the Patient Advocate and Liaison Services (PALS) (which took on the advisory 
role of CHCs) and Patient and Public Involvement Forums (PPIFs) (which took over 
the role of CHCs in monitoring and reviewing services).183 The latter were 
subsequently replaced by Local Involvement Networks (LINKs).184 The Conservative-
Liberal Democrat coalition government replaced LINKs with Local Healthwatch (LHW) 
organisations185 and also created Healthwatch England,186 which is part of the Care 
Quality Commission (CQC), to enhance the collective voice of patients.187 LHWs are 
weaker than their predecessors as they are prohibited from advocating a change in 
law or policy.188 Healthwatch England’s lack of independence, due to it being part of 
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the CQC, has led to it being described as ‘‘toothless’’.189 The various reforms to patient 
and public involvement within the NHS have been criticised. For example, the Francis 
Report (published following the public inquiry into poor care and high mortality rates 
at Mid Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust) contained a damning indictment of 
Labour’s reforms.190 The House of Commons Health Committee determined, in 2007, 
that patient and public involvement had been conflated leading to ‘‘muddled initiatives 
and uncertainty’’.191 Patient involvement is a response to medical paternalism, while 
public involvement draws on democratic theory.192 In the following paragraphs I argue 
that both can be enhanced to empower patients and the public.  
 
The proposed reform to ensure that mediation is offered in contentious cases is a 
welcome means of potentially empowering patients and their carers, and the Nuffield 
Council on Bioethics noted that mediation is used in the US and can prevent 
disagreements crystallising as conflicts.193 Recognising that mediation would not 
provide an answer to every dilemma, the Nuffield Council on Bioethics also stated that 
it could provide for better communication, reduce acrimony and narrow down the 
issues requiring formal adjudication by the courts.194 Mediation may have helped in 
the Gard case where Constance Yates notes that ‘‘matters quickly became 
antagonistic’’.195 The protracted dispute in that case was traumatic for Charlie’s 
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parents and stressful for his clinicians.196 The use of mediation in such cases was 
suggested by Francis J197 and has received academic support,198  Although it has 
been underused in the NHS due to a lack of awareness and dedicated funding 
mediation used successfully in other countries.199 Currently, where mediation is used 
within the NHS, this may be informal or formal. The former involves issues being 
resolved within an NHS entity via PALS, a Complaints Team or an independent person 
or advocate.200 Where a dispute cannot be resolved informally, it may go to formal 
mediation, although not all NHS entities offer this.201 Nonetheless, there is increased 
interest in mediation across the NHS as a whole, as a potential means of reducing the 
costs of claims and disputes. For example, NHS Resolution (an arms-length body of 
the Department of Health and Social Care, which manages claims and disputes) 
committed to extending mediation in its five-year strategy published in 2017.202  
 
In contrast to litigation, which is adversarial, inflexible, backward-looking, time-
consuming, costly and results in an externally imposed judgment, mediation is 
consensual, flexible, forward-looking, relatively quick, relatively cheap and may lead 
to a mutually agreed solution.203 The Department of Health awarded the Medical 
Mediation Foundation (MMF) a grant to pilot a mediation service.204 In addition to legal 
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reform to ensure that mediation is offered where contentious cases arise, MMF’s work 
indicates that improved staff training may also ameliorate potential tensions. There is 
evidence that staff can be trained to focus on empathy and communication skills to 
enable them to more ably recognise conflict triggers and to de-escalate conflicts.205 
Such training has benefited staff at both Evelina Children’s Hospital (part of Guy’s and 
St Thomas’ NHS Foundation Trust) in London and SGH.206 
 
Lord Mackay and Baroness Hollins proposed an amendment to the Mental Capacity 
(Amendment) Bill,207 to ensure that medical mediation be offered in contentious 
cases.208 In addition, they proposed an amendment for the Secretary of State for 
Health and Social Care to make provision for all NHS bodies to have access to a 
Clinical Ethics Committee and to require certain cases (such as those where a dispute 
has arisen) to be referred to such committees.209 Currently, in cases where there is a 
referral to such committees, there is variation in terms of patient involvement.210 
Consequently, thought should also be given as to how to improve the involvement of 
patients and their carers in the work of such committees. The proposed reforms are 
unlikely to be effected by the Mental Capacity (Amendment) Bill as Lord 
O’Shaughnessy (the Parliamentary Under Secretary of State at the Department of 
Health and Social Care) has advised that such reform is best pursued elsewhere211  
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and the aforementioned proposal to substitute the best interests test with the 
significant harm test was not part of the amendments put forward. If the law is changed 
to ensure that mediation is offered where contentious cases arise in the future, this 
should ensure that such mediation is adequately funded and may prevent cases 
proceeding to court, a goal shared by those across the law reform debate in this area. 
 
In respect of public involvement, as mentioned above, voice mechanisms within the 
NHS have been weakened in recent years. Beresford argues that attenuated 
government strategies for public feedback, such as consultations, are of limited 
effectiveness, tend not to be valued by service users and can discourage more 
effective involvement.212 The government has recently conducted consultations on 
whether the NHS should continue to provide some treatments of questionable 
effectiveness213 and on NHS reorganisation, via the development of Integrated Care 
Partnerships (ICPs).214 Such consultations seem unlikely to enable the public to have 
a meaningful influence on the shape of the health service and the treatments it offers. 
In defending the current law, Close et al stated that it is ‘‘justifiable that resource trade-
offs are left to administrative decision makers, rather than the courts’’.215 In contrast, I 
contend that this task should not be left solely to administrators. Rather, as the Alma 
Ata Declaration stated, ‘‘people have the right and duty to participate individually and 
collectively in the planning and implementation of their health care’’.216 Bhatia 
contends that both the medical and legal professions have been unwilling to take the 
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lead in meaningful dialogue in this area.217 However, in contrast to Bhatia, who regards 
Parliament as the appropriate arena for such dialogue regarding resource realities,218 
I advocate democratisation of the NHS to empower patients to have more influence in 
this respect.  
 
The NHS (Reinstatement) Bill, drafted by Allyson Pollock and Peter Roderick, which 
has been introduced in Parliament on several occasions, would, if enacted, re-
establish CHCs within the NHS.219 It would also restructure the NHS by replacing 
CCGs with Health Boards, to assess needs and plan services.220 Although CHCs 
compare favourably to their aforementioned successors, they may not enhance 
democratic control within the service as this was not the intention behind their original 
creation in the 1970s.221 Consequently, if CHCs are re-established, they should also 
be reformed to ensure that they are representative (one criticism of CHCs was that 
they were not sufficiently representative222) and given powers to effect wider changes 
in the health service (something which their previous incarnations had limited ability to 
do223). If a national association of CHCs were also re-established, it could co-ordinate 
public consultations regarding alterations to the structure of the NHS and the 
treatments that it provides. It would have the advantage of being a permanent body, 
in contrast to the aforementioned ad hoc consultations. The election of decision 
makers within the NHS has also been advocated as a means of democratising the 
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service.224 Elections to re-established CHCs or Health Boards could stimulate 
democratic deliberation within the NHS and enhance social learning.225 Ultimately, 
democratising the NHS could afford the public, informed by medical opinion and 
evidence, the opportunity to influence, through deliberation, what treatments (including 
experimental treatments when they arise) should be available. The pertinent questions 
of distributive justice raised by the Gard and Evans cases could thus be more clearly 
answered through the process of democratic deliberation before contentious individual 
cases arise. This would empower the public without contravening international law and 
may remove the need for court involvement, although, in some instances, clinicians 




The Charlie Gard and Alfie Evans cases have led to calls for the reform of the law 
concerning disputes between parents and medical practitioners regarding the 
treatment of infants. I argued against the proposal to substitute the best interests test 
with a significant harm test for the following reasons: the change would make UK law 
incompatible with international law; parents are not always the best people to make 
decisions about their children’s medical treatment (for example, because grief and 
hope may incline them to not accept the limits of medicine); reform could have adverse 
distributive consequences; and, the proposed change may ultimately be unworkable, 
                                                          
224 See for example, F Messer, The National Health Service: A Miracle of Social Welfare. Can it be 
saved? (London: Co-op Political Committee, 1971) 12 and W Hutton, New Life for Health: The 
Commission on the NHS Chaired by Will Hutton (London: Vintage, 2000) 6. 
225 P Vincent-Jones, ‘Embedding Economic Relationships through social learning? The Limits of 
Patient and Public Involvement in Healthcare governance in England’, 2011, Journal of Law and 
Society, 38, 215. 
41 
 
if parents cannot find doctors to treat their children in accordance with their wishes. 
Although I argue that the current trend of the questioning of expertise may have 
pernicious consequences, I also concede that reforms are needed to empower 
patients and the public within the NHS.  It is clear that the proposal to ensure that 
mediation is offered in cases where disputes arise could empower patients and their 
carers and that the NHS should be democratised to afford the public more say over its 
structure and the services it provides. 
 
 
 
